Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Recent research has shown that the integrity of sensor measurements can be violated through out-of-band signal injection attacks. These attacks target the conversion process from a physical quantity to an analog property—a process that fundamentally cannot be authenticated. Out-of-band signal injection attacks thus pose previously-unexplored security risks by exploiting hardware imperfections in the sensors themselves, or in their interfaces to microcontrollers. In response to the growing-yet-disjointed literature in the subject, this article presents the first survey of out-of-band signal injection attacks. It focuses on unifying their terminology and identifying commonalities in their causes and effects through a chronological, evolutionary, and thematic taxonomy of attacks. By highlighting cross-influences between different types of out-of-band signal injections, this paper underscores the need for a common language irrespective of the attack method. By placing attack and defense mechanisms in the wider context of their dual counterparts of side-channel leakage and electromagnetic interference, this study identifies common threads and gaps that can help guide and inform future research. Overall, the ever-increasing reliance on sensors embedded in everyday commodity devices necessitates that a stronger focus be placed on improving the security of such systems against out-of-band signal injection attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1109/COMST.2019.2952858 | IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Out-of-band,signal injections,hardware imperfections,mixed-signal systems,survey,attacks and defenses | Journal | 22 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 1553-877X | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.36 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ilias Giechaskiel | 1 | 33 | 6.61 |
| Kasper Bonne Rasmussen | 2 | 679 | 46.48 |