Paper Info
Title
Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation.
Abstract
We present the first maliciously secure protocol for succinct non-interactive secure two-party computation (SNISC): Each player sends just a single message whose length is (essentially) independent of the running time of the function to be computed. The protocol does not require any trusted setup, satisfies superpolynomial-time simulation-based security (SPS), and is based on (subexponential) security of the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. We do not rely on SNARKs or “knowledge of exponent”-type assumptions.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_8
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
2019
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Andrew Morgan1196.43
Rafael Pass22260112.83
Antigoni Polychroniadou312.38