Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide means to generate chip individual keys, especially for low-cost applications such as the Internet of Things (IoT). They are intrinsically robust against reverse engineering, and more cost-effective than non-volatile memory (NVM). For several PUF primitives, countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate side-channel weaknesses. However, most mitigation techniques require substantial design effort and/or complexity overhead, which cannot be tolerated in low-cost IoT scenarios. In this paper, we first analyze side-channel vulnerabilities of the Loop PUF, an area efficient PUF implementation with a configurable delay path based on a single ring oscillator (RO). We provide side-channel analysis (SCA) results from power and electromagnetic measurements. We confirm that oscillation frequencies are easily observable and distinguishable, breaking the security of unprotected Loop PUF implementations. Second, we present a low-cost countermeasure based on temporal masking to thwart SCA that requires only one bit of randomness per PUF response bit. The randomness is extracted from the PUF itself creating a self-secured PUF. The concept is highly effective regarding security, low complexity, and low design constraints making it ideal for applications like IoT. Finally, we discuss trade-offs of side-channel resistance, reliability, and latency as well as the transfer of the countermeasure to other RO-based PUFs. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1007/978-3-030-68773-1_14 | CONSTRUCTIVE SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS AND SECURE DESIGN (COSADE 2020) |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Physically unclonable function, Side-channel analysis, RO PUF, Loop PUF, Masking, Countermeasure, IoT | Journal | 12244 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 1 | 0.40 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lars Tebelmann | 1 | 6 | 2.23 |
| Jean-Luc Danger | 2 | 1 | 0.40 |
| Michael Pehl | 3 | 5 | 3.25 |