Abstract | ||
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A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol enables a prover to convince a verifier of the truth of a statement without leaking any other information by sending a single message. The main focus of this work is on exploring short pairing-based NIZKs for all \\(\\mathbf{NP} \\) languages based on standard assumptions. In this regime, the seminal work of Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (J.ACM’12) (GOS-NIZK) is still considered to be the state-of-the-art. Although fairly efficient, one drawback of GOS-NIZK is that the proof size is multiplicative in the circuit size computing the \\(\\mathbf{NP} \\) relation. That is, the proof size grows by \\(O(|C|\\kappa )\\), where C is the circuit for the \\(\\mathbf{NP} \\) relation and \\(\\kappa \\) is the security parameter. By now, there have been numerous follow-up works focusing on shortening the proof size of pairing-based NIZKs, however, thus far, all works come at the cost of relying either on a non-standard knowledge-type assumption or a non-static q-type assumption. Specifically, improving the proof size of the original GOS-NIZK under the same standard assumption has remained as an open problem. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2020 | 10.1007/978-3-030-45727-3_13 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | 2020 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Shuichi Katsumata | 1 | 8 | 7.88 |
Ryo Nishimaki | 2 | 131 | 14.91 |
Shota Yamada | 3 | 94 | 18.10 |
Takashi Yamakawa | 4 | 12 | 9.35 |