Paper Info
Title
Manufacturer'S Contract Choice Facing Competing Downstream Online Retail Platforms
Abstract
Reseller contract and online marketplace contract are two typical supply chain contracts provided by Online retail platforms (ORPs) in online retailing. Manufacturers can either wholesale their products to an ORP using the traditional reseller contract or choose an agency selling contract to sell their products directly to consumers through an online marketplace provided by the ORP. Based on a game model, this paper studies the contract choice strategy for a monopoly manufacturer facing two competing downstream ORPs. The results show that the competition intensity between the ORPs and the order-fulfilment costs critically moderates the choice decision. Specifically, for a given competition intensity (level of order-fulfilment costs), with rising order-fulfilment costs (the downstream competition intensity), the preferred mode for the manufacturer switches from the pure online marketplace mode to the hybrid mode and then to the pure reseller mode. The intuition of this lies in the interaction of the transfer of the pricing rights and the responsibility for order fulfilment. Meanwhile, the conditions to ensure the dominant equilibrium in the competition of ORPs are analysed. Finally, we extend the basic model by relaxing the assumptions about the same proportion fee rate and the fixed order-fulfilment cost.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1080/00207543.2020.1744767
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
Keywords
DocType
Volume
supply chain management, retail supply chain, contract choice, online retail platform, downstream competition, online marketplace, order-fulfilment cost
Journal
59
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
10
0020-7543
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bingbing Liu100.34
Xiaolong Guo200.34
Yugang Yu314325.29
lin tian4153.86