Name
Abstract | ||
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We build on an emerging line of work which studies strategic manipulations in training data provided to machine learning algorithms. Specifically, we focus on the ubiquitous task of linear regression. Prior work focused on the design of strategyproof algorithms, which aim to prevent such manipulations altogether by aligning the incentives of data sources. However, algorithms used in practice are often not strategyproof, which induces a strategic game among the agents. We focus on a broad class of non-strategyproof algorithms for linear regression, namely ℓp norm minimization (p > 1) with convex regularization. We show that when manipulations are bounded, every algorithm in this class admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium outcome. We also shed light on the structure of this equilibrium by uncovering a surprising connection between strategyproof algorithms and pure Nash equilibria of non-strategyproof algorithms in a broader setting, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we analyze the quality of equilibria under these algorithms in terms of the price of anarchy.
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Year | DOI | Venue |
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2020 | 10.5555/3398761.3398824 | AAMAS '19: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Auckland
New Zealand
May, 2020 |
DocType | ISBN | Citations |
Conference | 978-1-4503-7518-4 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safwan Hossain | 1 | 1 | 2.71 |
| Nisarg Shah | 2 | 5 | 3.46 |