Abstract | ||
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Coupon has been a major marketing tool that promotes sales for new and repeated buyers and proven effective in numerous realistic scenarios. In this paper, we mainly focus on the problem of designing coupons to maximize the revenue in second-price auction. Firstly, we derive the dominant strategies of bidders if they are provided with coupons in second-price auction and prove that the revenue optimization problem with coupons for all the bidders is NP-complete. Secondly, we cast the problem of designing coupons to maximize revenue into a learning framework. With well-designed loss functions, we perform theoretical analysis of its properties and propose corresponding algorithms to solve the problem. Finally, with both synthetic data and industrial data, extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate their effectiveness.
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Year | DOI | Venue |
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2020 | 10.5555/3398761.3398905 | AAMAS '19: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Auckland
New Zealand
May, 2020 |
DocType | ISBN | Citations |
Conference | 978-1-4503-7518-4 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Weiran Shen | 1 | 5 | 8.25 |
Pingzhong Tang | 2 | 133 | 32.06 |
Xun Wang | 3 | 0 | 1.01 |
Yadong Xu | 4 | 0 | 1.01 |
Xiwang Yang | 5 | 375 | 12.72 |