Paper Info
Title
Cooperation on Interdependent Networks by Means of Migration and Stochastic Imitation
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory in the realm of network science appeals to a lot of research communities, as it constitutes a popular theoretical framework for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent research has shown that cooperation is markedly more resistant in interdependent networks, where traditional network reciprocity can be further enhanced due to various forms of interdependence between different network layers. However, the role of mobility in interdependent networks is yet to gain its well-deserved attention. Here we consider an interdependent network model, where individuals in each layer follow different evolutionary games, and where each player is considered as a mobile agent that can move locally inside its own layer to improve its fitness. Probabilistically, we also consider an imitation possibility from a neighbor on the other layer. We show that, by considering migration and stochastic imitation, further fascinating gateways to cooperation on interdependent networks can be observed. Notably, cooperation can be promoted on both layers, even if cooperation without interdependence would be improbable on one of the layers due to adverse conditions. Our results provide a rationale for engineering better social systems at the interface of networks and human decision making under testing dilemmas.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.3390/e22040485
ENTROPY
Keywords
DocType
Volume
cooperation,interdependent networks,mobile agents,prisoner's dilemma,snowdrift game,game theory,mobility,rational agents
Journal
22
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
4
1099-4300
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.35
0
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Sayantan Nag Chowdhury110.69
Srilena Kundu210.35
Maja Duh310.35
Matjaž Perc410.69
Dibakar Ghosh594.75