Paper Info
Title
SmokeBomb: effective mitigation against cache side-channel attacks on the ARM architecture
Abstract
Cache side-channel attacks abuse microarchitectural designs meant to optimize memory access to infer information about victim processes, threatening data privacy and security. Recently, the ARM architecture has come into the spotlight of cache side-channel attacks with its unprecedented growth in the market. We propose SmokeBomb, a novel cache side-channel mitigation that functions by explicitly ensuring a private space for each process to safely access sensitive data. The heart of the idea is to use the L1 cache of the CPU core as a private space by which SmokeBomb can give consistent results against cache attacks on the sensitive data, and thus, an attacker cannot distinguish specific data used by the victim. Our experimental results show that SmokeBomb can effectively prevent currently formalized cache attack methods.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1145/3386901.3388888
MobiSys '20: The 18th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services Toronto Ontario Canada June, 2020
DocType
ISBN
Citations 
Conference
978-1-4503-7954-0
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
7
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
haehyun cho1166.55
Jinbum Park200.68
Donguk Kim329626.68
Ziming Zhao432230.52
Yan Shoshitaishvili535826.98
Adam Doupé635733.14
Gail-Joon Ahn73012203.39