Title
Feasibility of Cross-Chain Payment with Success Guarantees
Abstract
We consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby customers of different escrows---implemented by a bank or a blockchain smart contract---successfully transfer digital assets without trusting each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did not require this success, or any form of progress. We demonstrate that it is possible to solve this problem when assuming synchrony, in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a known amount of time, but impossible to solve without assuming synchrony. Yet, we solve a weaker variant of this problem, where success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1145/3350755.3400264
SPAA '20: 32nd ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures Virtual Event USA July, 2020
DocType
ISSN
ISBN
Conference
Proc. 32nd ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA'20, July 2020, pp. 579-581
978-1-4503-6935-0
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Rob J. van Glabbeek11930134.34
Vincent Gramoli200.34
Pierre Tholoniat300.34