Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Marked mix-nets were introduced by Pereira and Rivest as a mechanism to allow very efficient mixing that ensures privacy but at the cost of not guaranteeing integrity. This is useful in a number of e-voting schemes such as STAR-Vote and Selene. However, the proposed marked mix-net construction comes with no proof of security and, as we show in this paper, does not provide privacy even in the presence of a single corrupt authority. Fortunately, the attack that we present is easy to prevent and we show several possible ways to address it. Finally while the original marked mix-net paper worked with ElGamal, we identify conditions that the adopted encryption scheme should satisfy in order to be appropriate for a marked mix-net. This opens the possibility of building marked mix-nets based on intractability assumptions which are believed to hold in the presence of a quantum computer. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1007/978-3-030-54455-3_26 | Financial Cryptography Workshops |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thomas Haines | 1 | 5 | 10.26 |
| Olivier Pereira | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Peter B. Rønne | 3 | 12 | 9.33 |