Title
Power Grid State Estimation under General Cyber-Physical Attacks
Abstract
Effective defense against cyber-physical attacks in power grid requires the capability of accurate damage assessment within the attacked area. While some solutions have been proposed to recover the phase angles and the breaker status of lines within the attacked area, existing solutions made the limiting assumption that the grid stays connected after the attack. To fill this gap, we study the problem of recovering the phase angles and the breaker status under a general cyber-physical attack that may partition the grid into islands. To this end, we (i) show that the existing solutions and recovery conditions still hold if the post-attack power injections in the attacked area are known, and (ii) propose a linear programming-based algorithm that can perfectly recover the breaker status under certain conditions even if the post-attack power injections are unknown. Our numerical evaluations based on the Polish power grid demonstrate that the pro-posed algorithm is highly accurate in localizing failed lines even though the conditions for perfect recovery can be hard to satisfy.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1109/SmartGridComm47815.2020.9303007
2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)
Keywords
DocType
ISBN
Power grid state estimation,cyber-physical attack,failure localization
Conference
978-1-7281-6359-8
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
7
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yudi Huang110.69
Ting He292.15
Nilanjan Ray Chaudhuri311.03
Thomas La Porta480191.33