Title
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences
Abstract
We consider the problem of choosing a set of locations of a public good on the real line R when agents have single-peaked preferences over points. We ordinally extend preferences over compact subsets of R, and extend the results of Ching and Thomson (1996), Vohra (1999), and Klaus (2001) to choice correspondences. We show that efficiency and replacement-dominance characterize the class of target point functions (Corollary 2) while efficiency and population-monotonicity characterize the class of target set correspondences (Theorem 1).
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1007/s00355-020-01245-3
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Single-peaked preferences,Population-monotonicity,Replacement-dominance,Target point functions,Target set correspondences
Journal
55.0
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3
0176-1714
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bettina Klaus120.85
Panos Protopapas200.34