Paper Info
Title
Truthful Auction Analysis and Design in Multiunit Heterogenous Spectrum Markets With Reserve Prices
Abstract
We a practical multiunit heterogeneous spectrum market in which each buyer may request multiple channels with different bid prices at different geographical regions and each channel is associated with a reserve price indicating the desired revenue of the seller. The degree-of-freedom brought by multiunit trading and (reserve and bid) price diversity in such a market can be exploited to break the truthfulness of the two most popular schemes adopted by secondary spectrum auctions, namely Myerson's Optimal Mechanism (MOM) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), via bidder self-collusion. In this paper, we conduct a thorough analysis on the root causes of untruthfulness in MOM and VCG, and prove the fundamental theories addressing when MOM and VCG are truthful and when their truthfulness is broken by bid rigging. Particularly, we demonstrate how self-collusion is exploited in MOM and VCG to improve the untruthful bidders' utility. The critical findings provide a guidance for us to design a Self-collusion Resistant Auction (SIRI) in multiunit heterogeneous spectrum markets with reserve prices. The economic properties of SIRI are proved via rigorous theoretical analysis.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1109/TCCN.2020.2996602
IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Truthfulness,self-collusion,reserve price,multiunit heterogeneous spectrum market
Journal
7
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
2332-7731
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Wei Li133228.56
Xiuzhen Cheng23238210.23
Zhi Tian311514.04
Shengling Wang431237.32
Rongfang Bie554768.23
Jiguo Yu6688108.74