Abstract | ||
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In ASIACRYPT 2014, Jean et al. proposed the authentication encryption scheme Deoxys, which is one of the third-round candidates in CAESAR competition. Its internal block cipher is called Deoxys-BC that adopts the tweakey frame. Deoxys-BC has two versions of the tweakey size that are 256 bits and 384 bits, denoted by Deoxys-BC-256 and Deoxys-BC-384, respectively. In this paper, we revaluate the security of Deoxys-BC-256 against the meet-in-the-middle attack to obtain some new results. First, we append one round at the top and two rounds at the bottom of a 6-round distinguisher to form a 9-round truncated differential path with the probability of 2(-144). Based on it, the adversary can attack 9-round Deoxys-BC-256 with 2(108) chosen plaintext-tweaks, 2(113.6) encryptions and 2(102) blocks. Second, we construct a new 6.5-round distinguisher to form 10-round attacking path with the probability of 2(-152). On the basis of it, the adversary could attack 10-round Deoxys-BC-256 with 2(115) chosen plaintext-tweaks, 2(171) encryptions and 2(152) blocks. These two attacks improve the previous cryptanalytic results on reduced-round Deoxys-BC-256 against the meet-in-the-middle attack. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2020 | 10.1093/comjnl/bxaa028 | COMPUTER JOURNAL |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
authentication encryption schemes, tweakable block ciphers, Deoxys-BC, the meet-in-the-middle attack, the meet-in-the-middle distinguisher | Journal | 63 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
12 | 0010-4620 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 6 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ya Liu | 1 | 82 | 13.16 |
Bing Shi | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
Dawu Gu | 3 | 644 | 103.50 |
Fengyu Zhao | 4 | 0 | 1.69 |
Wei Li | 5 | 0 | 1.69 |
Zhiqiang Liu | 6 | 31 | 11.71 |