Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Persistent fault analysis (PFA) consists in guessing block cipher secret keys by biasing their substitution box. This paper improves the original attack of Zhang et al. on AES-128 presented at CHES 2018. By a thorough analysis, the exact probability distribution of the cipher-text (under a uniformly distributed plaintext) is derived, and the maximum likelihood key recovery estimator is computed exactly. Its expression is turned into an attack algorithm, which is shown to be twice more efficient in terms of number of required encryptions than the original attack of Zhang et al. This algorithm is also optimized from a computational complexity standpoint. In addition, our optimal attack is naturally amenable to key enumeration, which expedites full 16-bytes key extraction. Various tradeoffs between data and computational complexities are investigated. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1007/978-3-030-68773-1_1 | CONSTRUCTIVE SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS AND SECURE DESIGN (COSADE 2020) |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Persistent fault analysis, Substitution box, Maximum likelihood distinguisher, Key enumeration | Conference | 12244 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sebastien Carre | 1 | 2 | 1.72 |
| Sylvain Guilley | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Olivier Rioul | 3 | 92 | 23.54 |