Paper Info
Title
Effort Complementarity And Sharing Rules In Group Contests
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a prize-sharing rule design problem in a group contest with effort complementarities within groups by employing a CES effort aggregator function. We derive the conditions for a monopolization rule that dominates an egalitarian rule if the objective of the rule design is to maximize the group's winning probability. We find conditions under which the monopolization rule maximizes the group's winning probability, while the egalitarian rule is strictly preferred by all members of the group. Without effort complementarity, there cannot be such a conflict of interest.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1007/s00355-020-01277-9
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
DocType
Volume
Issue
Journal
56
2
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0176-1714
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Katsuya Kobayashi100.34
Hideo Konishi212635.99