Paper Info
Title
Transparency Of Sim Profiles For The Consumer Remote Sim Provisioning Protocol
Abstract
In mobile communication, User Equipment (UE) authenticates a subscriber to a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) using credentials from the MNO specified SIM profile that is securely stored inside the SIM card. Traditionally, a change in a subscriber's SIM profile, such as a change in a subscription, requires replacement of the physical SIM card. To address this shortcoming, the GSM Association (GSMA) has specified the consumer Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP) protocol. The protocol enables remote provisioning of SIM profiles from a server to SIM cards, also known as the embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC). In RSP, any GSMA-certified server is trusted by all eUICCs, and consequently any server can provision SIM profiles to all eUICCs, even those not originating from the MNO associated with the GSMA-certified RSP server. Consequently, an attacker, by compromising a server, can clone a genuine SIM profile and provision it to other eUICCs. To address this security problem, we present SIM Profile Transparency Protocol (SPTP) to detect malicious provisioning of SIM profiles. SPTP assures to the eUICC and the MNO that all SIM provisioning actions-both approved and unapproved-leave a permanent, non-repudiatable trail. We evaluate security guarantees provided by SPTP using a formal model, implement a prototype for SPTP, and evaluate the prototype against a set of practical requirements.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1007/s12243-020-00791-2
ANNALS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Consumer RSP, SIM profile cloning, eSIM security, Transparency
Journal
76
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3-4
0003-4347
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Abu Shohel Ahmed100.34
Mukesh Thakur200.34
Santeri Paavolainen300.34
Tuomas Aura455277.28