Title
Pricing-Based Interference Management Scheme In Lte-V2v Communication With Imperfect Channel State Information
Abstract
In this paper, an effective LTE-V2V (long-term-evolution vehicle-to-vehicle) communication system is studied, where the uplink channel of the cellular user equipment (CUE) is reused by the multiple V2V links. Considering the co-channel interference caused by channel reusing between CUE and V2V links, a pricing framework of interference management for V2V links and CUE is proposed. In the LTE-V2V communication networks, the base station (BS) protects the serving CUE by pricing the cross-tier interference caused by V2V links. A Stackelberg game is presented to model the interaction between the BS and V2V links. In order to ensure the communication quality of CUE, the total interference generated by V2V links has to be lower than the interference threshold. Specifically, the BS prices the tolerable interference to maximize its revenue. For the given prices, the V2V links competitively adapt their power allocation strategies to maximize the individual utility. Two pricing iterative algorithms, uniform pricing scheme and the non-uniform pricing scheme, are proposed to incorporate with the theory of noncooperative game, in order to analyze the competition between V2V links. In addition, the time-varying characteristics of vehicle communication are considered due to the high-speed mobility of the V2V users. The imperfect channel state information (CSI) fading model is constructed with the large-scale fading and small-scale fading jointly. Numerical simulation results validate the reliability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1016/j.comcom.2020.12.002
COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Vehicular network, Interference management, Power allocation, Pricing scheme, Game theory
Journal
166
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0140-3664
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zhixin Liu18119.38
Yongkang Wang200.34
yazhou yuan347.17
Kit Yan Chan400.34