Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), while formally well defined in a wider class of games, are explicitly restricted to games with perfect recall. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.011 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Extensive form games,Perfect recall,Linear games,Sequential equilibrium,Quasi-perfect equilibrium,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Perfect equilibrium | Journal | 124 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0899-8256 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Hillas | 1 | 4 | 2.24 |
| Dmitriy Kvasov | 2 | 14 | 2.87 |