Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Tor provides anonymity to millions of users around the globe, which has made it a valuable target for malicious actors. As a low-latency anonymity system, it is vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks from strong passive adversaries, such as large autonomous systems. Estimations of the risk posed by such attackers as well as the evaluation of defense strategies are mostly based on simulations and data retrieved from BGP updates. However, this might only provide an incomplete view of the network and thereby influence the results of such analyses. It has already been acknowledged in previous studies that direct path measurements, e.g. with traceroute, could provide valuable information. But in the past, such measurements were thought to be impossible, because they require the placement of measurement nodes in the same ASes as the respective Tor network nodes. With the rise of new technologies and methodologies, this assumption needs to be re-evaluated. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1007/978-3-030-58201-2_16 | SEC |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wilfried Mayer | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Georg Merzdovnik | 2 | 71 | 8.21 |
| Edgar Weippl | 3 | 856 | 105.02 |