Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
The evolution of cooperation in dynamically spatial networks with reciprocal preference and heterogeneous linking rules |
Abstract | ||
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The evolution of cooperation can be investigated using Prisoners' Dilemma game(PD) models on spatial networks. It has been shown that other-regarding preferences, such as inequality aversion, a taste for fairness, or reciprocal preference, can cause cooperative behavior to evolve. In this paper, we consider whether relationships among agents, alone or in combination with reciprocal preference, can drive cooperation. We study the emergence of cooperation in PD games on a two-dimensional spatial network where some individuals are reciprocators, altering their future behavior based on comparison with a randomly chosen neighbor. Simulation results show that, if the intensity of reciprocal preference is fixed, the frequency of cooperation increases with the fraction of reciprocators. When reciprocal preference intensity is high, a low level of cooperation can be sustained, even if there are few reciprocators -- though cooperation does not diffuse through the population. We also show that the particular linking rule matters, in that cooperators are more likely to survive under a Cooperate-Stay, Defect-Shift (CSDS) linking rule, as opposed to a Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) rule. As the fraction of reciprocators increases, the CSDS rule provides a more favorable environment for the evolution of cooperation. In addition, there is a threshold fraction of reciprocators such that a large value of network evolution strength contributes to cooperation most the threshold is exceeded. On the other side of the threshold, stronger reciprocal preference intensity does not necessarily promote cooperation more powerfully. Our results provide insight into how relations between neighbors can be a potent force, in combination with reciprocal preference, in inducing cooperation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2020 | 10.1109/SMC42975.2020.9283139 | 2020 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC) |
Keywords | DocType | ISSN |
Spatial game on networks,Evolution of cooperation,Reciprocal preference,Heterogeneous linking rules | Conference | 1062-922X |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-7281-8527-9 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
5 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ding Wang | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Peng Guo | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| D. Marc Kilgour | 3 | 571 | 70.61 |