Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In early 2018, the disclosure of Spectre
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and Meltdown
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exposed the security risks inherent in speculative and out-of-order execution, which were hitherto considered harmless and valuable performance optimizations. In a nutshell, these attacks demonstrated that transient execution, where the computer executes code speculatively before reverting execution, leaves side effects on the microarchitecture, allowing adversaries to retrieve data across software- and hardware-enforced security boundaries. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2021 | 10.1109/MSEC.2020.3036146 | IEEE Security & Privacy |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
microarchitectural security games,system attacks,security risks,whack-a-meltdown,system defenses | Journal | 19 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 1540-7993 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.35 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Daniel Genkin | 1 | 579 | 31.18 |
| Yuval Yarom | 2 | 775 | 35.54 |