Title
Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings
Abstract
We study the classical problem of matching n agents to n objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead of asking the agents to report their complete preferences, our goal is to learn a desirable matching from partial preferences, specifically a matching that is necessarily Pareto optimal (NPO) or necessarily rank-maximal (NRM) under any completion of the partial preferences. We focus on the topk model in which agents reveal a prefix of their preference rankings. We design efficient algorithms to check if a given matching is NPO or NRM, and to check whether such a matching exists given top-k partial preferences. We also study online algorithms for eliciting partial preferences adaptively, and prove bounds on their competitive ratio.
Year
Venue
DocType
2021
THIRTY-FIFTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
35
2159-5399
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hadi Hosseini12414.28
Vijay Menon293.23
Nisarg Shah327026.36
Sujoy Sikdar4113.93