Title
Game-Theoretic Planning for Risk-Aware Interactive Agents.
Abstract
Modeling the stochastic behavior of interacting agents is key for safe motion planning. In this paper, we study the interaction of risk-aware agents in a game-theoretical framework. Under the entropic risk measure, we derive an iterative algorithm for approximating the intractable feedback Nash equilibria of a risk-sensitive dynamic game. We use an iteratively linearized approximation of the system dynamics and a quadratic approximation of the cost function in solving a backward recursion for finding feedback Nash equilibria. In this respect, the algorithm shares a similar structure with DDP and iLQR methods. We conduct experiments in a set of challenging scenarios such as roundabouts. Compared to ignoring the game interaction or the risk sensitivity, we show that our risk-sensitive game-theoretic framework leads to more timeefficient, intuitive, and safe behaviors when facing underlying risks and uncertainty.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1109/IROS45743.2020.9341137
IROS
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Conference
1
0.35
References 
Authors
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mingyu Wang113524.90
Negar Mehr245.52
Adrien Gaidon331.75
Mac Schwager493072.33