Title
A Dynamic Duopoly Game With Content Providers' Bounded Rationality
Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two content providers (CPs). Competition between two CPs is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and the credibility of content they offer. According to the CPs' rationality level, we consider a scenario where both CPs are bounded rational. Each CP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamical system induced by bounded rationality, and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.
Year
DOI
Venue
2020
10.1142/S0218127420500959
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BIFURCATION AND CHAOS
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Pricing, credibility of content, Nash equilibrium, bounded rationality, chaotic behavior, bifurcation, stability
Journal
30
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
7
0218-1274
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hamid Garmani102.03
Driss Ait Omar202.70
Mohamed El Amrani303.38
Mohamed Baslam400.34
Mostafa Jourhmane500.34