Title
Forward–Backward algorithms for stochastic Nash equilibrium seeking in restricted strongly and strictly monotone games
Abstract
We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems with expected valued cost functions whose pseudogradient satisfies restricted monotonicity properties which hold only with respect to the solution. We propose a forward-backward algorithm and prove its convergence under restricted strong monotonicity, restricted strict monotonicity and restricted cocoercivity of the pseudogradient mapping. To approximate the expected value, we use either a finite number of samples and a vanishing step size or an increasing number of samples with a constant step. Numerical simulations show that our proposed algorithm might be faster than the available algorithms.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9682852
2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
DocType
ISSN
ISBN
Conference
0743-1546
978-1-6654-3660-1
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Franci Barbara113.39
Sergio Grammatico201.01