Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
We Can Pay Less: Coordinated False Data Injection Attack Against Residential Demand Response in Smart Grids |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
ABSTRACTAdvanced metering infrastructure, along with home automation processes, is enabling more efficient and effective demand-side management opportunities for both consumers and utility companies. However, tight cyber-physical integration also enables novel attack vectors for false data injection attacks (FDIA) as home automation/ home energy management systems reside outside the utilities' control perimeter. Authentic users themselves can manipulate these systems without causing significant security breaches compared to traditional FDIAs. This work depicts a novel FDIA that exploits one of the commonly utilised distributed device scheduling architectures. We evaluate the attack impact using a realistic dataset to demonstrate that adversaries gain significant benefits, independently from the actual algorithm used for optimisation, as long as they have control over a sufficient amount of demand. Compared to traditional FDIAs, reliable security mechanisms such as proper authentication, security protocols, security controls or, sealed/controlled devices cannot prevent this new type of FDIA. Thus, we propose a set of possible impact alleviation solutions to thwart this type of attack. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2021 | 10.1145/3422337.3447826 | CODASPY |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 1 | 0.35 |
References | Authors | |
16 | 4 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thusitha Dayaratne | 1 | 4 | 1.43 |
| Carsten Rudolph | 2 | 4 | 2.78 |
| Ariel Liebman | 3 | 10 | 2.89 |
| Mahsa Salehi | 4 | 40 | 7.54 |