Title | ||
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Timescales Diversity Induces Influencers To Persist Cooperation On Scale-Free Networks |
Abstract | ||
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Based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we study the effect of the diverse strategy-updating time scale on the evolution of cooperation under the normalized payoff framework. Agents can adjust their strategy-updating speed according to their fitness and collective influence, and this mechanism promotes the emergence of cooperation on Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks. Moreover, agents with higher values of collective influence may have longer persistence-cooperation duration and diffuse their cooperative behaviors among neighbors efficiently. Through investigating the game-learning skeleton, we find that the heavy-tailed in-degree distribution emerges and influencers with proper depth length play an important role in maintaining cooperation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2021 | 10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401147 | 2021 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS (ISCAS) |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | 0271-4302 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Yajun Mao | 1 | 0 | 1.35 |
Qian Zhao | 2 | 0 | 1.35 |
Rongxuan Song | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
Zhi-Hai Rong | 4 | 128 | 9.78 |
Jiasheng Hao | 5 | 0 | 1.01 |