Title
Timescales Diversity Induces Influencers To Persist Cooperation On Scale-Free Networks
Abstract
Based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we study the effect of the diverse strategy-updating time scale on the evolution of cooperation under the normalized payoff framework. Agents can adjust their strategy-updating speed according to their fitness and collective influence, and this mechanism promotes the emergence of cooperation on Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks. Moreover, agents with higher values of collective influence may have longer persistence-cooperation duration and diffuse their cooperative behaviors among neighbors efficiently. Through investigating the game-learning skeleton, we find that the heavy-tailed in-degree distribution emerges and influencers with proper depth length play an important role in maintaining cooperation.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401147
2021 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS (ISCAS)
DocType
ISSN
Citations 
Conference
0271-4302
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yajun Mao101.35
Qian Zhao201.35
Rongxuan Song300.34
Zhi-Hai Rong41289.78
Jiasheng Hao501.01