Title
A Succinct Representation Scheme for Cooperative Games under Uncertainty.
Abstract
In this work we present a novel succinct representation for large partially observed cooperative games. The proposed representation exploits estimates over marginal contributions to form compact rules representing collaboration patterns with uncertain value. Specifically, given an initial set of MC-nets rules that use prior beliefs over values instead of the actual ones, we propose two types of merging that lead to a new set of even more compact rules.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.5555/3463952.3464193
AAMAS
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Conference
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Errikos Streviniotis100.34
Athina Georgara200.68
Georgios Chalkiadakis340040.00