Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and problematic extension to general normal form games. We give such a generalization based on concept of program equilibria, and point out that that a practically relevant generalization may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria that are special cases Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2021 | 10.4204/EPTCS.335.19 | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK) |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | EPTCS 335, 2021, pp. 213-227 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 1 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gabriel Istrate | 1 | 99 | 24.96 |