Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Can the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders promote corporate innovation? |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Chinese listed companies recently come out a set of serious agency problems. For example, directors and controlling shareholders highly override company interests. Conventional governance methods such as introducing non-executive directors couldn't effectively solve this problem. The proposal of encouraging non-controlling major shareholders to actively participate in corporate decision-making becomes more popular nowadays. This paper studies the mechanism of non-controlling major shareholders' exit threat on corporate innovation, and explore the impact of property rights and corporate life cycles on this mechanism. The result shows the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders did not promote corporate innovation. This is mainly because major shareholders pursue short-term benefits and tend to support financial asset investment rather than R&D investment. Our research also come out that the inhibitory effect of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders on corporate innovation is more significant for non-state-owned and mature enterprises in China. This article finds Chinese capital market investors pay more attention to short-term interests and lack the long-term value investment awareness, which is not conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2022 | 10.1080/09537325.2021.1931673 | TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Non-controlling majorshareholders, exit threat, corporate innovation, financial asset | Journal | 34 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
8 | 0953-7325 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chaohui Xu | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Yingjie Xu | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Feng’en Li | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |