Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we give the first formal security analysis on the one-more unforgeability of blind ECDSA. We start with giving a general attack on blind ECDSA, which is similar to the ROS attack on the blind Schnorr signature. We formulate the ECDSA-ROS problem to capture this attack. Next, we give a generic construction of blind ECDSA based on an additive homomorphic encryption and a corresponding zero-knowledge proof. Our concrete instantiation is about 40 times more bandwidth efficient than the blind ECDSA in AsiaCCS 2019. After that, we give the first formal proof of one-more unforgeability for blind ECDSA, under a new model called algebraic bijective random oracle. The security of our generic blind ECDSA relies on the hardness of a discrete logarithm-based interactive assumption and an assumption of the underlying elliptic curve. Finally, we analyze the hardness of the ECDSA-ROS problem in the algebraic bijective random oracle model. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2021 | 10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_16 | COMPUTER SECURITY - ESORICS 2021, PT II |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Blind signature, ECDSA, One-more unforgeability | Conference | 12973 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xianrui Qin | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Cailing Cai | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Tsz Hon Yuen | 3 | 507 | 33.86 |