Abstract | ||
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In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents in an exchange economy á la Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), with agents’ measure space having both atoms and an atomless sector. We proceed by following the idea of Aubin (Mathematical methods of game economic theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1979) to allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions, that induces an enlargement of the set of ordinary coalitions to the so-called fuzzy or generalized coalitions. We propose a notion of fairness which, besides efficiency, imposes absence of envy towards fuzzy coalitions, and which fully characterizes competitive equilibria and Aubin-core allocations. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2021 | 10.1007/s00182-021-00780-2 | International Journal of Game Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Fairness, Fuzzy coalitions, Equal-income Walrasian allocations, Mixed markets | Journal | 50 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
4 | 0020-7276 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 6 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Chiara Donnini | 1 | 0 | 1.35 |
Pesce, Marialaura | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |