Paper Info
Title
Fairness and fuzzy coalitions
Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents in an exchange economy á la Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), with agents’ measure space having both atoms and an atomless sector. We proceed by following the idea of Aubin (Mathematical methods of game economic theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1979) to allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions, that induces an enlargement of the set of ordinary coalitions to the so-called fuzzy or generalized coalitions. We propose a notion of fairness which, besides efficiency, imposes absence of envy towards fuzzy coalitions, and which fully characterizes competitive equilibria and Aubin-core allocations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1007/s00182-021-00780-2
International Journal of Game Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Fairness, Fuzzy coalitions, Equal-income Walrasian allocations, Mixed markets
Journal
50
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
4
0020-7276
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
6
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Chiara Donnini101.35
Pesce, Marialaura200.34