Abstract | ||
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ABSTRACTEasyCrypt is a formal verification tool used extensively for formalizing concrete security proofs of cryptographic constructions. However, the EasyCrypt formal logics consider only classical at- tackers, which means that post-quantum security proofs cannot be formalized and machine-checked with this tool. In this paper we prove that a natural extension of the EasyCrypt core logics permits capturing a wide class of post-quantum cryptography proofs, settling a question raised by (Unruh, POPL 2019). Leveraging our positive result, we implement EasyPQC, an extension of EasyCrypt for post-quantum security proofs, and use EasyPQC to verify post- quantum security of three classic constructions: PRF-based MAC, Full Domain Hash and GPV08 identity-based encryption. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2021 | 10.1145/3460120.3484567 | Computer and Communications Security |
Keywords | DocType | Citations |
Formal verification, post-quantum cryptography | Conference | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.35 | 0 | 9 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Manuel Barbosa | 1 | 1 | 0.35 |
Gilles Barthe | 2 | 2337 | 152.36 |
Xiong Fan | 3 | 1 | 0.35 |
Benjamin Grégoire | 4 | 817 | 48.93 |
Shih-Han Hung | 5 | 1 | 0.35 |
Jonathan Katz | 6 | 7579 | 347.97 |
Pierre-Yves Strub | 7 | 1 | 0.35 |
Xiaodi Wu | 8 | 49 | 9.39 |
li zhou | 9 | 58 | 10.92 |