Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Crowdsourcing has become an effective tool to utilize human intelligence to perform tasks that are challenging for machines. Many truth discovery methods and incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been proposed. However, most of them cannot deal with the crowdsourcing with copiers, who copy a part (or all) of data from other workers. This article aims at designing crowdsourcing incentive mechanism for truth discovery of textual answers with copiers. We formulate the problem of maximizing the social welfare such that all tasks can be completed with the least confidence for truth discovery and design an three-stage incentive mechanism. In contextual embedding and clustering stage, we construct and cluster the content vector representations of textual crowdsourced answers at the semantic level. In truth discovery stage, we estimate the truth for each task based on the dependence and accuracy of workers. In reverse auction stage, we design a greedy algorithm to select the winners and determine the payment. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation. Moreover, our truth discovery methods show prominent advantage in terms of precision when there are copiers in the crowdsourcing systems. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2022 | 10.1109/TSC.2021.3075741 | IEEE Transactions on Services Computing |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Crowdsourcing,truth discovery,incentive mechanism,Bayesian analysis,semantic analysis | Journal | 15 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
5 | 1939-1374 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jianzhong Li | 1 | 3196 | 304.46 |
| X Niu | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Jian Xu | 3 | 224 | 55.55 |
| Dejun Yang | 4 | 1685 | 93.08 |
| Lijie Xu | 5 | 261 | 23.85 |