Paper Info
Title
BitMine: An End-to-End Tool for Detecting Rowhammer Vulnerability
Abstract
Rowhammer is a destructive software-induced DRAM fault, which an attacker can leverage to break system security. Both individual customers and enterprise users (e.g., cloud providers) might refrain from using a computing system if it is vulnerable to rowhammer vulnerability. In this paper, we provide the first end-to-end tool, coined BitMine, that systematically assesses a DRAM chip's vulnerability to rowhammer bit flips. BitMine is an extension of DRAMDig. As DRAM address mappings are proprietary techniques and critical in inducing rowhammer bit flips, DRAMDig, our prior work, leverages domain knowledge to efficiently and deterministically reverse-engineer DRAM address mappings on Intel machines. By incorporating DRAMDig, BitMine configures three key parameters, i.e., hammer methods, hammer patterns, data patterns, on the effectiveness of finding rowhammer bit flips. BitMine by default implements 13 hammer methods, 4 hammer patterns and 16 data patterns and is extensible to support more. We evaluate DRAMDig and BitMine against multiple machine models that combine different DRAM chips and Intel microarchitectures. Our experiment results show that DRAMDig efficiently uncovers a deterministic DRAM address mapping for each machine model, and every implemented parameter in BitMine has its distinct effectiveness in triggering bit flips for different machine models.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1109/TIFS.2021.3124728
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Random access memory, Tools, Timing, Microarchitecture, Indexes, Codes, Security, Rowhammer, DRAM address mapping, hammer method, hammer pattern, data pattern
Journal
16
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
1556-6013
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
9
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zhi Zhang1113.92
Wei He2639.93
Yueqiang Cheng365.51
Wenhao Wang46010.80
Yansong Gao5102.96
Minghua Wang66415.40
Kang Li700.34
Surya Nepal83913.80
Yang Xiang92930212.67