Paper Info
Title
Price decisions with asymmetric reference effect and information sharing in dual-channel supply chains
Abstract
This paper considers a retailer-manufacturer dual-channel supply chain (DCSC) consisting of a retail channel and a direct sale channel. Previous literature has shown that either asymmetric reference effect (ARE) or information sharing (IS) significantly impacts customers' demand, then the channel members' pricing decisions. As yet, no literature has examined the joint effect of both on the channel members' pricing decisions, especially in a DCSC. To fill up the deficiency, we first explore and compare the pricing decisions in a centralized and a decentralized DCSC with ARE, respectively, with and without IS, using the Stackelberg game and two-stage optimization technique. Then we evaluate the values of ARE and IS by introducing model misspecification and numerical experiments. We find that substantial revenue will be lost if the retailer ignores ARE when information is shared than not shared, especially when the channel members are pessimistic about the market. A higher reference price or a weaker ARE induces the channel members to increase prices, and make IS more valuable to them. Besides, whether the information is shared or not, channel members generally underestimate revenues under a relatively high reference price, while overestimating the revenues under a relatively small reference price. Furthermore, the manufacturer conditionally accepts the IS while the retailer always accepts it.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.1051/ro/2022018
RAIRO-OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Supply chain management, asymmetric reference effect, information sharing, dual-channel, Stackelberg game
Journal
56
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
1
0399-0559
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Nenggui Zhao100.68
Qiang Wang200.34
Jie Wu340936.02