Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This article investigates the multiplayer pursuit-evasion (MPE) differential games in the presence of malicious pursuers. First, three types of malicious pursuers, namely
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">greedy</i>
,
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">lazy</i>
, and
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">traitorous</i>
pursuers are formulated by using two
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">subjectively malicious factors</i>
in the performance index. Then, an
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">N</i>
-player nonzero-sum game framework is established to study the relationships among healthy pursuers, malicious pursuers, and evaders. The capturability and Nash equilibrium of such a new MPE differential game are rigorously analyzed. Finally, the effects of malicious pursuers on the capture time are explicitly quantified by the
<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">minimal pursuit coefficient</i>
, whose explicit form is obtained by the solutions from coupled Riccati differential equations. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2022 | 10.1109/TAC.2022.3168430 | IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Fault-tolerant control,malicious agents, $N$ -player nonzero-sum game,pursuit-evasion differential games | Journal | 67 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
9 | 0018-9286 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 13 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yuhang Xu | 1 | 10 | 4.25 |
| Hao Yang | 2 | 413 | 41.99 |
| Bin Jiang | 3 | 2540 | 191.98 |
| Marios Polycarpou | 4 | 2020 | 206.96 |