Title
Strategic transfers between cooperative games
Abstract
We consider a model where the same group of players is involved in more than one cooperative (transferable utility) game. A rule determines the payoffs per game, and for each player a utility function evaluates the resulting vector of payoffs. We assume that each player, independently, can make transfers of worth between different games, thereby affecting its payoff vector and, thus, utility. Two transfer systems are considered, resulting in two distinct noncooperative games, and the focus of the paper is on establishing existence and a characterization of Nash equilibria in these games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.003
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C71
Journal
133
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0899-8256
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Caroline Berden100.34
Hans Peters23921.55
Laura Robles300.34
Dries Vermeulen400.34