Paper Info
Title
Environmental quality and population welfare in Markovian eco-evolutionary dynamics
Abstract
Environmental change and human behavior are co-depended. The quality of the environment affects human's welfare, and the human's behavior in turn changes the environment. Yet the co-dependent nature seems to give a single individual few capabilities to change the environment. Intuitively, it is the collective actions that matter. What is a single individual able to do with the population welfare and the environment? We set up a toy model to explicitly address this issue. We take into account the eco-evolutionary nature of the feedback between environment and human behavior. One strategy, termed as Welfare Time strategy, is found, using which one individual suffices to set a linear relationship between collective welfare and environmental quality, no matter what the opponent does. This linear relationship can be either positively or negatively correlated, which is also unilaterally set by a single individual. It indicates that collective welfare can be higher even if it takes longer in a poor environment. Furthermore, we prove that the Welfare-Time strategy is able to dominate Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy, which is evolutionary stable against many strategies in repeated games. Our work reveals a hidden relationship between population welfare and the environment quality, which can be controlled unilaterally by a single individual. In addition, it implies that a single individual is able to control the environmental quality, provided that the rule of the environmental dynamics is known. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.1016/j.amc.2022.127309
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Human behavior, Environment, Feedback, Welfare-Time strategy
Journal
431
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0096-3003
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Fanglin Liu100.34
Bin Wu201.01