Title | ||
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SCI-FI: Control Signal, Code, and Control Flow Integrity against Fault Injection Attacks |
Abstract | ||
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Fault injection attacks have become a serious threat against embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that some faults inside the microarchitecture escape all typical software fault models and so software counter-measures. Moreover, state-of-the-art counter-measures, hardware-only or with hardware support, do not consider the integrity of microarchitectural control signals that are the target of these faults. We present SCI-FI, a counter-measure for Control Signal, Code, and Control-Flow Integrity against Fault Injection attacks. SCI-FI combines the protection of pipeline control signals with a fine-grained code and control-flow integrity mechanism, and can additionally provide code authentication. We evaluate SCI-FI by extending a RISC-V core. The average hardware area overheads range from 6.5% to 23.8%, and the average code size and execution time increase by 25.4% and 17.5% respectively. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2022 | 10.23919/DATE54114.2022.9774685 | PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2022 DESIGN, AUTOMATION & TEST IN EUROPE CONFERENCE & EXHIBITION (DATE 2022) |
Keywords | DocType | ISSN |
fault injection attacks, code integrity, control-flow integrity, execution integrity, control logic, counter-measures | Conference | 1530-1591 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Thomas Chamelot | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
Damien Courousse | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
Karine Heydemann | 3 | 116 | 13.65 |