Title
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Population Games under the Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking in population games under the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and subject to general affine equality constraints. In particular, we consider that the payoffs perceived by the decision-making agents are provided by a so-called payoff dynamics model (PDM), and we show that an appropriate PDM effectively steers the agents to a GNE. More formally, using Lyapunov stability theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the set of generalized Nash equilibria of the game, for the case when the game is a so-called stable game (also known as contractive game). Furthermore, we illustrate the application of the considered framework to an energy market game considering coupled equality constraints over the players decisions.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.23919/ECC55457.2022.9838437
2022 EUROPEAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (ECC)
DocType
Citations 
PageRank 
Conference
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Juan Martinez-Piazuelo100.34
Carlos Ocampo-Martinez200.34
Nicanor Quijano300.34