Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We analyze an infinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of elections. The folk theorem suggests that a wide range
of policy paths can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria when parties and voters are sufficiently patient. We go beyond
this result by imposing several suitable refinements and by giving separate weak conditions on the patience of voters and
the patience of parties under which every policy path can be supported. On the other hand, we show that only majority undominated
policy paths can be supported in equilibrium for arbitrarily low voter discount factors: if the core is empty, the generic
case in multiple dimensions, then voter impatience leads us back to the problem of non-existence of equilibrium. We extend
this result to give conditions under which core equivalence holds for a non-trivial range of voter and party discount factors,
providing a game-theoretic version of the Median Voter Theorem in a model of repeated Downsian elections. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2006 | 10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1 | International Journal of Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
elections · repeated game · subgame perfect equilibrium · folk theorem · median voter theorem ·,Elections,Repeated game,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Folk theorem,Median voter theorem | Patience,Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Median voter theorem,Economics,Microeconomics,Equivalence (measure theory),Subgame perfect equilibrium,Repeated game,Folk theorem,Multiple time dimensions | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
35 | 1 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.92 | 2 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Duggan | 1 | 241 | 145.72 |
| Mark Fey | 2 | 48 | 12.13 |