Name
Affiliation
Papers
JOHN DUGGAN
Department of Political Science and Department of Economics,University of Rochester,Rochester,USA
30
Collaborators
Citations 
PageRank 
16
241
145.72
Referers 
Referees 
References 
278
78
97
Search Limit
100278
Title
Citations
PageRank
Year
Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war10.412020
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players.00.342017
Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria.00.342017
Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections.00.342017
Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson.10.362017
Limits of acyclic voting.10.392016
Preference exclusions for social rationality.10.402016
Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs20.432015
A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model00.342015
Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions.00.342015
A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games.50.562014
Uncovered sets.40.532013
Dynamic legislative policy making.101.312012
A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games20.742011
Private polling in elections and voter welfare71.152009
Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem101.192009
Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis40.672008
A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets71.012007
Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections61.092007
Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates71.062007
Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model111.992006
Endogenous Voting Agendas.20.462006
Repeated Downsian electoral competition30.922006
A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games111.852006
Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates186.912005
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining131.952003
Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections175.072002
Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments115.642001
A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries2458.472001
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized6349.472000