Abstract | ||
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The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2005 | 10.1007/11600930_2 | WINE |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
semi-anonymous player,partially-specified large game,nash equilibrium,informational detail,important class,structurally-robust nash equilibrium,structural robustness | Conference | 3828 |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
0302-9743 | 3-540-30900-4 | 7 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.08 | 1 | 1 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ehud Kalai | 1 | 135 | 44.65 |