Title
Partially-Specified large games
Abstract
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1007/11600930_2
WINE
Keywords
DocType
Volume
semi-anonymous player,partially-specified large game,nash equilibrium,informational detail,important class,structurally-robust nash equilibrium,structural robustness
Conference
3828
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0302-9743
3-540-30900-4
7
PageRank 
References 
Authors
1.08
1
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ehud Kalai113544.65