Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica45 (1977), 665–681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2002 | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2896 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Public goods,probabilistic mechanism,strategy-proofness,random dictatorship. | Journal | 106 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 0022-0531 | 4 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
2.07 | 1 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bhaskar Dutta | 1 | 214 | 54.87 |
| Hans Peters | 2 | 120 | 30.92 |
| Arunava Sen | 3 | 95 | 17.85 |