Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
asymptotic behavior | Population,Mathematical economics,Economics,Fictitious play,Appeal,Homogeneous,Representative agent,Asymptotic analysis | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
71 | 1 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
8 | 0.84 | 8 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Drew Fudenberg | 1 | 175 | 44.93 |
| Satoru Takahashi | 2 | 15 | 2.64 |