Name
Affiliation
Papers
DREW FUDENBERG
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, f2dfudenberg@harvard.eduf2
28
Collaborators
Citations 
PageRank 
28
175
44.93
Referers 
Referees 
References 
300
61
57
Search Limit
100300
Title
Citations
PageRank
Year
A reputation for honesty00.342022
Intervention with limited information00.342022
Working to learn00.342021
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium00.342021
Machine learning for evaluating and improving theories00.342020
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs.20.512018
"I'm just a soul whose intentions are good": The role of communication in noisy repeated games.00.342017
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach.10.372016
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags.30.552014
Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem90.882014
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play80.842011
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games30.482011
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal30.582011
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring30.422011
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents20.622010
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique10.402009
Random matching in adaptive dynamics30.762009
When is reputation bad?101.462008
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations10.662008
An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning20.372007
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient161.912007
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games20.622007
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions111.592007
Imitation processes with small mutations173.572006
Learning to play Bayesian games233.562004
Word-of-mouth learning4211.792004
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction30.722002
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria1010.252000