Paper Info
Title
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
Abstract
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
DocType
Volume
D7
Journal
72
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
0899-8256
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.39
8
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jordi Massó110316.46
Inés Moreno de Barreda220.39